Building Fort Phil Kearney
Part II
The following article appeared in the National Tribune,
on June 14, 1928. It is an eye-witness account of the living
conditions in the military forts in the 1860s, written by William
Murphy, a survivor of the Fetterman Massacre. This was generously
contributed by Mr. and
Mrs. Don Houck of Bellevue, WA, and we sincerely appreciate
this gift! It was transcribed by Kathie MacDonald, and we appreciate her hard
work! This is the second of the four part series.
WINNING OF THE WEST FOR
THE NATION
Building Fort Phil Kearny
About 300 Men Composed the Garrison
Wood Train Attacked on Dec. 6, 1866
Fetterman's Company Sent to Relieve the Wagon Train
Reinforcements Sent Under Command of Capt. Tenyck
By WILLIAM MURPHY, Co. A, 18th U. S.
At this time the 2d Battn. of the 18th Inf. was
divided up by leaving the two companies at Fort Reno to relieve
two volunteer companies. Four companies went 65 miles north of
Reno and built Fort Phil Kearny. Two companies went 90 miles
farther north and built Fort C. F. Smith, on the bank of the Big
Horn, which left four companies at Phil Kearny.
I was among those left at this place. We started
in building the Fort Phil Kearny stockade, which was 600 feet by
800 feet in dimensions. The logs were set three feet in the
ground, projected eight feet, and were hewed on two sides to a
touching surface. We also built quarters for the officers,
warerooms, suttler's store, guardhouse, stockade for the mules,
and quarters for the men.
There were approximately 250 men at the fort, but
I could not vouch for the exact number. I was a member of Co. A,
of 48 men. Co. K was the largest and had about 65 men, if I
remember correctly. Some time after we established the fort, Co.
C, of the 2d U. S. Cav., arrived with some 60 men, which made
about 300 men all told. Some reports stated that we had a mounted
infantry, but that was a mistake. It was made up of about 30 men
who were detailed out of the infantry company at the fort.
On Dec 6, 1866, the wood train was attacked. In
itself this was nothing unusual, as it was almost an every-day
occurrence. Col. Carrington with Co. C, of the 2d Cav., and some
mounted men went to its relief. The Indians retreated and crossed
the Pineys, and Carrington followed them and nearly got trapped.
This was two or three miles north of where the massacre occurred
Dec. 21 following.
It was at this time that Lieut. Bingham and
Sergt. Bowers were killed. In Carrington's report he stated that
Lieut. Bingham had charge of the mounted men. Carrington himself
had charge of the command. Bingham was on the skirmish line and
was on the right flank with Sergt. Bowers and John Donovan.
Carrington saw his danger and had the
"recall" sounded. That left Lieut. Bingham, Sergt.
Bowers, and John Donovan cut off by the Indians. They dismounted
for a short time, but decided that their only chance was to run
the gauntlet, as their commander had retreated to a higher point.
Lieut. Bingham and Sergt. Bowers were pulled off their horses by
the Indians. John Donovan was armed with a Colt's army revolver
and a single-short Star carbine, using a cooper cartridge, the
same as a Spencer carbine.
The revolver, he told me, was all that saved him
when the Indians were on each side of him trying to pull him off
his horse, for just in the nick of time he shot one on each side.
He was a bunkie of mine and a good man, and was a Civil War
veteran. We both belonged to the same comany—2d Battn., 18th
U.S. He told me that Bingham was unarmed except for a cavalry
saber.
The Phil Kearny Massacre.
We had had a fine Fall, with cool nights, and on this day the
wood train left as usual about 7 o'clock to go to the timber. As
I remember, we mounted guard as usual at 8 o'clock.. I was in the
Orderly Sergeant's office giving him the money for the milk when
the order to have Co. A. to go to the relief of the wood train.
They "fell in" in front of our quarters, which was
the northwest men's quarters of the garrison. The main gate was
at the north end of the stockade. The road ran by the west end of
the quarters and passed by the Adjutant's office and all
officers' quarters to the Government storerooms and into the
stock corral.
The bastion of the stockade was at least 200 feet from where
the men fell in in front of the quarters. I see in Carrington's
report that one of his alibis was that the guard at the bastion
heard him tell Fetterman not to leave the wood train.
I was standing right there and saw the men start on a
double-quick and go up over Sullivans Hill, and I am certain that
this report was wrong. As a matter of fact, from the position of
the troops the guard could not have heard this or any command
given, for he would have had to hear the command thru the
buildings.
Another of his reports was that Maj. Powell was ordered to
take the detail, but as Capt. Fetterman was the senior officer he
stepped up and took charge. The facts of the case are that Capt.
Fetterman was the Captain of Co. A and it is ridiculous to think
that Maj. Powell would think of taking command of Co. A.
Fetterman was at the fort for only a short time; not over 15
days, from my recollection.
I did not see the mounted men go out. They never passed thru
the main fort, but went out either the east or the west side of
the stockade where the stock was kept. At the noon hour we could
hear volleys plainly and they continued for a long period of
time.
About 2 o'clock or 2:30 Col. Carrington ordered reinforcements
of about 45 men under Capt. Tenyck to go out. They went at a
double-quick, or as fast as they could, until they came to the
crossing of the Big Piney.
Wade the Icy River.
Cool nights had caused ice to form on the edges of the stream,
but this stream was hard to cross at any time of the year. The
men had to remove their shoes and stockings to get across. At
that time Col. Carrington's orderly, a man by the name of Sample,
met the reinforcements and told Capt. Tenyck that the men were
all dead and that the Indians were all over the ground where the
men had been.
Some of the men said that this was Sample's second trip out
with information. I could not say, as I saw him but the once for
certain. In reply to this Capt. Tenyck said that there were not
enough Indians in the country to kill the men.
He advanced along the road with a few men on each side on the
ridges as skirmishers. When they got to the top of the divide
which separates the Piney Creek from the Peno Valley, where the
men had been stationed, they found that the Indians had withdrawn
from where they had massacred the soldiers and seemed to be
rehearsing the battle.
They were shooting, shouting, and charging up and down the
hill over and over again. I supposed the hill must have been as
much as a mile away from where the men were massacred.
Our first thought was that the battle was still going on, but
a man from my company by the name of McLain, who had been with
the haying party and was familiar with the road, said,
"There are the men down there, all dead."
Sure enough. There was at that time a large stone that had the
appearance of having dropped from a great hight (height) and
thereby split open, leaving a space between the pieces men could
pass thru, which made a good protection for a small body of
men—I should say for about 25 or 30. Around this rock was
where the main body of the men lay.
There were just a few down on the side of the ridge north of
the rock not more than 50 feet from the main body. Along down the
ridge farther north and east we found the bodies of Capt. Brown,
the two citizens, Wheatly and Fisher, and also a man of my
company by the name of Beaber. They were scalped, stripped, and
mutilated.
 |
Corrections Noted..
They must have put up a hard fight, as they were all
armed with breech-loading rifles, and alot of empty
shells lay all around. The Indians had given Beaber an
extra dose. It looked as though they had first stripped
him and then filled his body with arrows, as they were
sticking out of him all over like porcupine quills.He
had straight black hair and looked something like an
Indian himself. He had passed thru the Civil War, as had
three-fourths of the men that were killed. In some
reports of the massacre it was stated that the men were
ambushed, but looking over the ground anyone could see,
and can now see, that they had a very good position for
the arms that were used in those days. There was no
stampede or ambush.
|
| In Carrington's book he stated that he sent two wagon
loads of ammunition to them by the relief, but the fact
was that he sent two empty wagons and an ambulance and
possibly one box of ammunition of 1,000 rounds (certainly
not more than that). These conveyances were used in
bringing in the dead, and could have been sent by the
Colonel for no other purpose. His statement on the face of it is impossible of
belief. In the first place he would not have sent two
loads (40,000 rounds) for a detail of 100 men, and in the
second place there was not even one load—20,000
rounds—in the three forts. |
After the massacre it was reported that there was in the fort
an average of 50 rounds per man for the survivors, and the men
undoubtedly killed after they ran out of ammunition.
They started out with 20 rounds each and undoubtedly used some
of this on their detail work before the massacre. On the ground
around the rocks there were thousands of arrows, a lot of which
were picked up by our men. We had known for a long time that we
were short of ammunition.
It was customary, I understood to have the guards have target
practice when they came off guard, but our guns were loaded when
we got into the Indian country and were kept so. We had no target
practice of any kind.
At the time of the massacre they tried to show that Capt.
Tenyck showed cowardice and took a roundabout way, but this was
not true. One thing was sure about Tenyck—there was no
cowardice in his make-up. He could not have taken a roundabout
way if he wanted to do so, as his command was in plain sight of
the fort.
There was an Indian riding around near where the bodies of the
dead were lying. He hollered for the men to come down. Capt.
Tenyck told some of the men to go down and load the wagons and
ambulances with the bodies. All of the bodies were stripped,
scalped, and mutilated with the exception of two who were not
scalped, but the Indians had drawn a buffalo bag over their
heads.
We returned to camp without firing a shot. It was dark when
the 45 men under Capt. Tenyck returned to the fort.
At the fort all was excitement. The magazine at the fort was a
half dugout located on the parade grounds. The men worked all
night there building a stockade all around it with green planks
and putting water and provisions inside in case of a siege. The
next afternoon Col. Carrington, with about 50 men, went after the
balance of the bodies. They dug a long trench and put two or
three bodies into each box.
A day or two after the massacre the weather turned bitterly
cold and the men were badly frozen trying to bury the dead. There
was a heavy fall of snow, which drifted the roads and ravines
badly. The master of transportation had deserted some time in
November and with him in his pockets went the money for our
supply of wood and hay.
It was reported that he went to Canada. We had to go seven
miles for pine wood for the officers. The men got green
cottonwood from the Piney bottoms and fed the tops to the mules.
The poor mules ate holes thru the logs in their stables.
We had to go to Reno, 65 miles away, for corn. The snow was
very deep and it took several days to make the trip. The men
suffered terribly as there was not shelter for men or mules, and
they were three or four nights out on the roads. The mercury
dropped to 25 and 40 below zero and kept that way for about six
weeks.
Our shoes were made of cheap split leather and the shoddy
clothes that were furnished at that time were not any protection.
One thing in our favor was that after the first few days' storm
we had very little wind. Burlap sacks were at a premium and saved
our lives. We wrapped them about our shoes to keep from freezing,
for there were not overshoes or rubbers to be had at the fort. A
few years later soldiers were furnished fur overcoats.
|
